


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## NAPOLEON AGAINST RUSSIA.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1806—1807, DECEMBER TO JUNE.

BY T. MILLER MAGUIRE, LL.D.

THE fact that the Russians in spite of their desperate tenacity, have succumbed for a period to the organising energy and superior skill and scientific accuracy in details of the Japanese may be the reason why the authorities have selected the Campaign of 1806—1807 in Poland, and in the North-East of Germany for the Staff College Entrance Examinations.

The soldiers of Benningsen set an example of dogged and desperate resolution to the soldiers of Kuropatkin, and Napoleon was even more amazed that the semi-savages of Sarmatia should dare to resist all his most strenuous efforts for six months, and to place his vast armies in situations of the utmost peril than were the Russians themselves when Kuroki and Oku and Nodsu threatened their communications between the Yalu and Mukden. Napoleon after Eylau was almost in as serious a position as was Kuropatkin after the Sha Ho.

But there are other lessons. After Eylau the British system of Party Government was fatal not only to the interests of our nation but also to the hopes of our Allies. Russia was induced by offers of effective British aid to attack Napoleon after his victories of Jena and Auerstadt and his occupation of Berlin, 1806, and, had the British made efficient use of their Fleet, with absolute mastery of the Seas, and the very fine Army which was idling at home or wasted on petty expeditions to South America and Egypt, they would have turned the Eylau reverse into a ruinous catastrophe. They could easily have got astride Napoleon's line of communications with the Rhine by landing at the Mouth of the Elbe or helping the Swedes in Pomerania. No wonder the Czar Alexander I., after the defeat of Friedland compelled the evacuation of Königsberg and an armistice, bitterly complained of the perversity and folly of his Allies. The youngest students of the elements of strategy can see for themselves that, had Austria moved from Bohemia to the Oder after the battle of Eylau, the fortresses of

stop, while the starboard screw, flying still, brings the ship over with a heavy list.

But she has circled as rapidly as the destroyers, which now are racing on the starboard side.

Great shafts of luminence leap across the water as the opponents direct their searchlights on each other. There is the roar of guns, the shriek of projectiles, a splash of flame where one of ours has struck the foredeck of a destroyer.

But it is not for this they came, and now they are off with a last defiant, futile shot.


Shall we follow? Scarcely. Has not the third destroyer which disappeared so mysteriously gone off to give the alarm? Are not these two trying to draw us to our doom? How skilful was their effort to force us ahead of our charge, and then, relying on superior steering powers, to circle and destroy the sheltering craft! Away they go back into the filmy smoke, from which once more leap out the Dragon eyes, that now grow smaller and smaller, until at length they disappear.

The whole incident has taken place so rapidly you hardly realise how it has happened. For the first time, however, you understand how fine is the margin between triumph and disaster—how absolutely upon quick wit and steady nerve rests the whole structure of the Empire. It is something to have witnessed such a sight as that just passed; to have felt, even in a small degree, the strain that must be borne by a single mind, watching the movements of an enemy; striving to read aright their purport, and to answer them with counter-moves requiring the instant control of scores of men stationed in different parts of the ship. This in play is perilous; think what now it means in war!

ALEXANDER GRAHAM-SIMPSON.

*(To be continued.)*

Silesia would have been saved, and hence Napoleon's line to Berlin across the Vistula and Oder would have been rendered insecure, and if the British had seized the northern line he would have been almost in as bad a case as was Joseph at Vittoria, especially



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with clouds of Cossacks hovering around his defeated army. Perchance the Beresina would have been anticipated at Frankfort on that river or at Kustrin.

When making terms the Czar justified himself on the ground that he had been betrayed by the English, who were only ready to

1900

send out an army when the success of Napoleon was complete, and he had more than compensated by Friedland for the repulse of Eylau.

Any student of British Imperial Strategy, and of the possibility of effective interposition by our navy and military forces, if well organised at decisive moments, should study this campaign carefully. In 1807 our Cabinet ministers declared that they could never interfere effectively in European struggles, yet they sent Moore and Wellesley to the Peninsula the next year, and Marlborough had been on the Danube, 1704, and Ligonier had charged at Dettingen, on the Maine, in 1743.

But the modern Darius, in his invasion of the north-east of Europe, defended by the fierce soldiery of Scythia, led his guards and his horsemen and long lines of splendidly served artillery into very different scenes from those rich and fertile and well-populated valleys and hills of Italy and South Germany and Saxony, which were the scenes of his brilliant campaigns of June, 1800 and 1805, and of October, 1806.

No wonder that Lannes wished to sacrifice to fortune by moderation, and to arrest the tide of victory which had flowed without check from Boulogne to Austerlitz, and thence to Berlin, Lubeck, and Stettin, on the banks of the Oder.

The heroic Duke of Montebello would not advise the invasion of the realms of the Poles and of the Cossacks, or disturbing the gloom of the Masurien, or quartering the gay soldiers of Touraine and Provence in the midst of the cold and dreary marshes and woodlands of that terrible Hyrcanian forest, which appalled the legionaries of the ablest Cæsars. The corps of Napoleon were almost as dismayed in the territory between the Oder and the Vistula as were the legions of Augustus between the Ems and the Elbe.

To the intoxication subsequent on the victories of Jena succeeded a mental disquietude, when, instead of the cantonments and repose which they expected, they found themselves dragged in the depths of winter to begin a new campaign amidst pathless snows, and gloomy and miserable and unpopulated districts, skies ever gloomy, and with the dread Baltic on their left flank, affording easy supplies to the enemy by numerous ports and river mouths, while all their requisitions, gathered at the expense of the inhabitants, might at any moment be cut off by a British expedition.

Strange to say, this campaign was really directed against the British, as was proved by the Emperor's establishment of that continental blockade against our commerce which, embodied first in the Berlin Decree of 1806, was definitely established as part of

the policy of the whole European Continent for years by the Treaty of Tilsit, July, 1807.

It was to the overthrow of the British power by the Ganges that a campaign was undertaken in the depths of winter on the banks of the Vistula. Let me quote one of Napoleon's brilliant orations, which, composed after the style of the harangues of Greek and Roman generals, his models in art and eloquence and war, remind us of the brilliant rhetoric of Xenophon and Alexander, and of many a Cæsar in the very crest of prosperity, or when his fortitude was tried by the fiercest buffets of adversity. A Cæsar or Napoleon was equal to either extremity of fortune. And Napoleon, like Hannibal, was never greater than in adversity; for example, in the spring of 1807 or in the winter of 1813. *Si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinæ.*

"Soldiers, we shall not lay down our arms till a general peace has secured the power of our allies and restored to our commerce liberty and its Colonies. On the Elbe and the Oder we have conquered Pondicherry, our establishments in the Eastern Seas, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Spanish Colonies. Who has given the Russians hope that they can balance the weight of destiny?"

Thus amidst the ice and snow of Northern Europe the thoughts of the Emperor were fixed on the maritime power of England and her Empire in Asia. But the imagination of the French people and soldiery were also captivated by another mirage, the revival of the empire of the Poles.

It is not our province to discuss the political institutions of Poland, nor how it was that Western Europe had allowed its partition, nor how the fell Suwarrow had caused not only Freedom, but the poet Campbell to shriek when Kusciosko fell. Suffice it to say that the French had felt a warm interest in the fortunes of this forlorn and very peculiar aristocracy of horsemen and democracy of soldiers, and Napoleon's aspirations were inflamed by unsettled plans for the revival of its proud position under his own sway and of making it a bulwark against Russia, from which he honestly believed Europe had much to fear. Nor was he at all adverse to cultivating the softer traits of the character of Alexander and of Cæsar, and forgetting for a while, in the society of the most charming of womenkind, the cares of Empire and the toils of war.

This design of using Poland as a basis of operations against Russia, Austria, and ultimately India, so seducing, so generous, if it had been practicable, was one of those enterprises with which the quick imagination of Napoleon would be smitten at that moment, and one of the imposing spectacles which it was consonant with

his greatness to give to the world. In marching into the midst of Poland, he added, it is true, to the difficulties of the actual war, the graver difficulties of all, those of climate and distance ; but he took from Russia and Prussia the resources of the Polish provinces, resources very considerable in men and grain ; he sapped the basis of the Russian power ; he essayed rendering Europe the service the most signal that he had ever rendered her ; he added new pledges to those of which he was already possessed, which would serve him to obtain from England maritime restitutions by means of continental ones. The vast countries placed on the road from the Rhine to the Vistula, the causes of weakness with an ordinary general, would become, under the greatest of soldiers, abundant resources of the things necessary in the war ; he would soon procure, thanks to an able administration, provisions, ammunition, arms, horses, and money. As to the climate, so formidable in those countries in November and December, he, no doubt, considered it ; but he had resolved in this campaign to halt on the Vistula. If they gave him this river under the proposed armistice, he had the design to establish himself there ; if, on the contrary, they contested it with him, he would conquer it in a few marches, and encamp his troops there during the winter, feed them with the corn of Poland, warm them with the wood of its forests, recruit them with the new soldiers coming from the Rhine, and, in the following spring, depart from the Vistula to go deeper into the North than any man had ever dared to go.

He held Austria aloof from the war by diplomacy, and succeeded by the skill of Sebastiani in gaining the co-operation of the Sultan Selim against Russia and the English, whose fleet, under Duckworth, met with a reverse in the Dardanelles.

Moreover, Marmont occupied Dalmatia, and was ready to help Turkey if need be against Russia. Hence the Czar Alexander was obliged to detach 60,000 men to the Pruth when they might have turned the tables against Napoleon on the line of the Vistula. Nothing escaped the far-reaching eyes of the Emperor. He took in the whole situation from London to Constantinople, and from the Adriatic to the Gulf of Bothnia, at a glance. He even brought distant Persia into his sphere of influence, and proposed to organise its resources and use them against the Allies. He raised the strength of the army, by antedating the conscription of 1807, to 580,000 men.

Having by the Berlin decree, November 21st, 1806, declared the British Isles in a state of blockade, though he might as well have bombarded the planet Mars, and, having secured his lines of communications, he started for the Polish provinces of Prussia. He



entered Posen on the 27th November, and was at Warsaw on the 20th December. Various Polish leaders joined him ; but some of the wisest, like Kusciosko, stood aloof. At the same time, aided by the skill of General Sebastiani, the Sultan Selim declared war on the Russians, thus diverting many other troops to the south ; and the English fleet under Duckworth, though for a while it dominated the Golden Horn, retired past the fortifications of the Dardanelles with loss.

I can only give a very concise summary of this marvellous campaign, and I must refer my readers to Jomini, or Dumas, or Thiers, and many other writers in French ; to Lettow-Vorbeck in German—he gives splendid maps ; would that I could reproduce them—or to Alison in English. As to the latter, he fills me with enthusiasm, and I wish I were allowed simply to quote him page by page. My readers would then have stores of eloquence and wisdom, as well as brilliant descriptions, seldom found in the monotonous dry-as-dusts, now called historians, as if history were a matter of quantitative analysis, or the philosophy of liquid films, or a study in conic sections. History is a matter of mind and soul, of poesy and imagination, and romance, of the fiercest pulsations of life, and of the most appalling hecatombs of death ; as at Heilsberg and Eylau. The historian does not deal with atoms, nor gaze on the dead and the dry bones of osteology ; he deals with the aspirations and prejudices, hopes and fears, virtues and crime, and food supply of living men—men in action, men in hordes.

On the passions, and on the endeavours of these men, one verse of an old song, one inspiriting phrase of an ardent hero, one fanatic invocation to Allah, one reminiscence of international hate, one glance of a good and lovely, or even of an unprincipled and leering female eye, would produce more potent influences than would all the calculations of all the philosophers from Democritus to Darwin.

From the ancient fortresses of Byzantium to the home of Virgil by the Eridanus, from the wall of Hadrian in North Britain to the gate of the Holy War in Servia, and to that plain where Gustavus Adolphus the Swede, at the beginning of a new era of European civilisation, taught a new art of war ; through all peoples as dissimilar as the Italians, and Bavarians, and Spanish, who fought for him, and the Scandinavians, and Britons, and Cossacks, who fought against him in North Germany, the name of the Corsican was everything :—everything to British seamen, to the Hetman of the Don, the ambassador of the Shah, the Prussian student, the Hungarian hussar. Nor, indeed, did Napoleon ever occupy a more prominent place in the minds of men than to-day, a hundred years after he reached the Maine on his march to the ruin of Prussia.

Napoleon said that the "art of war is nothing but the art of subsisting." After Eylau, he wrote to Talleyrand that "the fate of Europe and all our vast calculations hinge upon the means of subsistence." To beat the Russians, if I have bread enough, is mere child's play. Biscuit and brandy are all I require; they will defeat all the efforts of our enemies." There was nothing new in the principles which were the bases upon which he and his brilliant Marshals, and his able opponents, Benningsen, and Lestocq, and Bagration, and Platoff, founded all their orders to the myriads under their command. My readers will find that these principles are old and easily remembered. They were adopted by his predecessors—Xenophon, Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Zenglis, Tamerlane, and the great Sultans of Islam, as well as by Gustavus, Turenne, Marlborough, and Frederick: "To keep one's forces together, to bear speedily on any point, to be nowhere vulnerable—such are the principles that ensure victory. To inspire fear by the reputation of one's arms;—that is what maintains the fidelity of allies and the obedience of conquered nations."

Do my readers require further illustrations of the principles? We have set them forth in the campaigns of Wellington; and Lee and Moltke and Oyama have illustrated them in more recent times.

Would my readers wish for the very antitheses of these principles? Well, then, let them carefully peruse the speeches of English politicians since 1895, and the more thoroughly they become imbued with the spirit of Party, the less they will comprehend the secrets of Victory and the Soul of Humanity.

The Russians had committed the same fault as in the early part of the campaign of Ulm, they had permitted their allies to be beaten before they arrived on the scene, and only about 28,000 Prussians under their pay, who refused to accept any humiliating terms, were rallied on the Vistula. On the approach of the armies of Napoleon they retired eastward. And when the Emperor entered Warsaw, Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières were near Thorn; Soult and Augereau, in the centre, occupied Plock; Lannes, Murat, and Davoust, in the south-east, extended towards Siérock and Zakroezyn covering Warsaw. They had before them the territory watered by the Bug, which joins the Vistula about Czarnowo near Modlin. The Narew joins the Bug on the right, passing Ostrolenska, Pultusk, and Siérock, and on the north-west is joined by the Ukra near Ciechanew. The Russian Army, commanded by the veteran Kamenskoi, who soon lost his head, occupied the marshy districts between these rivers, and they might easily have adopted Napoleon's celebrated system of interior lines, as used before in

1796-7, in Italy, and afterwards in 1809 and 1814. Converging rivers give full scope to the action of detaining forces. But on the 23rd Napoleon advanced, and on the 26th December Lannes routed Benningsen at Pultusk; while Davoust, Augereau, and Murat drove Buxhowden from Golymin; and Ney, having defeated the Prussian corps of Lestocq, seized Soldau. These were, however, merely tactical successes, the tenacity of the Russian rear-guards, and the wretched state of the road, steeped in what Napoleon called the fifth element—*mud*, prevented the full success which can only be secured by effective pursuit. Then Napoleon put his soldiers into winter quarters along the Vistula, and Jerome Bonaparte and Vandamme took Glogau, Breslau, Schweidnitz, between the 2nd December and 2nd January; but Neisse was not taken till June. Mortier invaded what was then Swedish Pomerania, and blockaded Stralsund. Benningsen, who replaced Kamenskoi, took the offensive, wishing to interpose between Ney and Bernadotte and the other corps, which extended about a hundred miles, with their backs to the Vistula, and facing east. He proposed to attack these two Marshals and to recover his communications with Dantzic after overwhelming Napoleon's left. But Napoleon saw through the design. A glance at the map will show how it was foiled. The two threatened Marshals were to fall back rapidly south-west, where they joined Soult, having brushed aside the Russian advanced guards at Heilsberg, 22nd January, and Mohrungen, 25th January. They were then safe.

Now the genius of Napoleon proposed that Bernadotte should still further fall back, while the other corps turned the Russian left from the south-east and cut them off from Königsberg and hemmed them in between the mouth of the Vistula and the Frische Haf. Unfortunately, his despatch was taken by a Cossack, and he was foiled, as were his plans in 1814, and those of Wellington in 1812, and of Lee in 1862, by a similar accident.

Benningsen retreated just in time (1st February), just as Napoleon from Warsaw was on his left flank near Jonkowo. The Russian retreat was slow, as their general wished to give the Prussian Lestocq, who was in imminent danger, at Osterode, from Marshal Ney, time to escape to Königsberg. The retreat and pursuit were now very ably conducted. There was a skirmish at Hoff, 6th February, and on the 7th Marshal Soult drove Benningsen from the village of Preussisch Eylau. But the enemy fell back on the main body. It was so exhausted by fatigue, and disgusted with retreating, that the men welcomed a battle. Benningsen resolved to fight, though he was not yet joined by Lestocq, who was beaten by Ney at Deppen, Liebstedt, d

Spanden on the banks of the Passarge, and only escaped by a great bend to the north.

On the 8th February, both armies—each about 70,000 men—were ready for a desperate battle at Eylau. Here occurred the most terrible struggle since Malplaquet, and the fame of the Russian soldiers resounded through Europe. The Corps of Augereau ceased to exist; the Emperor himself was only saved from the furious attack of the Russians on the cemetery by his Guard; nor did the great masses of cavalry, charging again and again under Murat, Grouchy, Bessières, and Hautpool, produce any serious impression on the stolid enemy. Both sides claimed the victory, and both were exhausted; but manifestly at such a distance from his base, and with supplies depending on dubious allies, the position of Napoleon was hazardous to a degree. Both sides rested for four months—Benningsen near Königsberg, the French near Osterode; but Napoleon's energy, ability, and foresight were never better displayed.

The siege of Dantzic might be compared with that of Port Arthur in many respects, only that the French had not command of the sea—perhaps it would be better to compare it with the French siege of Cadiz. Of course its possession was of first importance as a flank position to both armies, and Lefebvre's success caused his elevation to the title of Duke of Dantzic. It was captured on the 26th May, and Weichselmunde two days afterwards.

Whatever may be said of the disadvantages of fortresses—and they may well become traps—they are of the utmost importance as pivots of operations. To ignore their importance is folly; to exaggerate their importance is to forget that men and not stones, brains and not hillocks or mounds or inundations, are the defence of nations.

But with the approach of summer, the French, who occupied the line of the Passarge, and the Russians, who occupied the line of the Alle, began to move. Ney was isolated at Guttstat in advance of the army. Probably this was a device of Napoleon to tempt the Russians to advance. If so, it was fine strategy. Ney was attacked, but not surprised; so were Soult, at Lomitten, and Bernadotte, at Spanden; but there was no confusion. They fell back steadily, and the whole French army, about 126,000 strong, were united under Napoleon on the Passarge. Benningsen withdrew to his great entrenched camp at Heilsberg. Now Napoleon might have turned his left, and driven the Russians back to the sea, or he might attack in front; and, turning their right, have forced the Russians away from their base of supply at Königsberg. A

terrible attack on the carefully prepared field-works failed on the 10th June. Giving up his front attack, Napoleon moved north along the left bank of the Alle to cut off the enemy from Königsberg. Benningsen complied with this manœuvre, moving in a parallel direction along the right bank. Eighteen thousand men fell killed or wounded at the Heilsberg entrenchments. But Benningsen soon turned on his adversaries, and drove a regiment of the cavalry of Lannes from the town of Friedland on the 13th June. The Marshal concentrated to the west of Friedland, where, on the morning of the 14th, he held the slow Russians in check till the other Marshals and the Emperor arrived on the scene.

The battle of Friedland was a fine specimen of Napoleon's stratagems; and, undoubtedly, whatever may be the general rule, in this case the Russians were wrong in fighting with the river Alle so close to their rear. The French army of 90,000 men formed a semi-circle around Friedland, both flanks touching the Alle. The Russians, in case of defeat, must pass the bridges of Friedland and then move to Wehlau, where the Alle and Prégel unite in the midst of a marshy plain traversed by a single *chaussée*. By that defile not only the artillery and carriages of the main army, but also the immense stores of baggage and ammunition train which must evacuate Königsberg, had to pass. Hence the Russians were in a very bad position indeed—worse than Pope at Second Bull Run, or Joseph at Vittoria, or Bazaine at Rezonville, or Kuropatkin at Mukden; and yet they escaped.

Napoleon's plan for the battle was simple. Mortier was to fall back towards the north, so as to draw the Russians after him as far as possible from Friedland—while Lannes stood firm in front of Friedland—Ney, at five in the afternoon, with Marchand and Dupont, and supported by the guns of Senarmont, and the dragoons of Latour-Maubourg, hurled his masses against the Russian left, defeated their Guards, drove back Benningsen's left and centre into the river, and burned the bridges and the town. Mortier and Lannes then advanced; the Russians were routed with a loss of 27,000 drowned, dead, wounded, or prisoners, and 80 guns; the French loss was about 10,000. A singular incident took place—at the first alarm the Cossacks crowded down the right bank of the Alle, and, swimming the river, advanced on the opposite side, and discharged a volley of *arrows* with considerable effect on the enemy.

Alison maintains that if Napoleon had followed up his success with his wonted vigour, the Russian host would have been utterly annihilated. But on this memorable occasion, as in many others, when engaged with the Russians, *e.g.* in 1812, it was apparent that the vigour of the Emperor, in following up his victories, was by

no means equal either to what it was in the German or Italian wars—but the explanation is easy; his troops were exhausted by the desperate nature of the resistance offered to them in these northern latitudes—soldiers trained in the methods of Suwarrow's Catechism were men of iron.

The Russians fell back on to the Prégel, and then to the Niemen. Soult captured Königsberg without any trouble on the 17th June. On the 19th Murat seized Tilsit on the Russian frontier, Benningsen sent Bagration to ask for an armistice—which was signed on the 21st June, and an interview between Alexander and Napoleon was arranged, which resulted in the celebrated Peace of Tilsit on the 8th July, 1807.

The allies of England have always been victimised by the base intrigues and incapacity of English party chiefs, so it was the case with the Dutch and Catalans in 1713, with Frederick the Great in 1762, and with the Czar in 1807. The latter made no secret of his indignation, and declared that if Napoleon hated the English he was Napoleon's friend—his principal reasons for making peace, as given by Hardenburg, IX. 425, were the refusal of Howick (Earl Grey), who had solicited the Czar to intervene after Jena, to guarantee the Russian subsidies, and the delay in the arrival of the troops which the English promised to send to the Baltic coasts. The arms for the Russian troops did not arrive till Königsberg had capitulated, and the campaign was over. Hence the Czar saw no reasons for sacrificing his Russians and bringing about the invasion of his country after desperate efforts which were not reciprocated, or even appreciated by selfish and ignorant vote-catchers. At the Conference of Tilsit, Napoleon played on Russian disappointment and indignation with rare art, and secured the Czar's hearty co-operation as against both Austria and England. One of the immediate results was Junot's invasion of Portugal in 1807, and the occupation of Madrid in 1808—which brought about the long-drawn Peninsular War.

#### NAPOLEON'S LIST OF FRENCH TROOPS AT FRIEDLAND.

Imperial Guard, Marshal Bessières, Duke of Istria	...	...	7,500
<i>Corps.</i>			
Marshal Lannes, Duke of Montebello	...	...	15,900
Marshal Ney, Duke of Elchingen	...	...	14,000
Marshal Mortier, Duke of Treviso	...	...	10,000
Marshal Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo, Prince wounded,			
Marshal Victor, Duke of Belluno, in command	...	...	22,000
Cavalry	...	...	11,500
			11,500
Total at Friedland	...	...	83,900

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## THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR.

BY F. J. SNELL.

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### III.

#### THE EMPEROR LEWIS AND THE ANGLO-GERMAN FIASCO.

IN the fourteenth century the condition of the unwieldy Holy Roman Empire and the position of its titular chief were very different from what they had been in the preceding age. The great office, the incumbent of which was now Lewis IV., or Lewis the Bavarian, rested under an eclipse as severe as that which had overtaken the Papacy. The princes of the several states had seized all real power into their hands and took care to exercise their electoral privileges in such a way as to preclude the installation of a genuine ruler—one that would revive the glories of the Hohenstaufen and their authority among the lesser lights. All semblance of the hereditary principle had vanished, and despite the efforts of emperors, pretenders, and partisans, it could not again be brought into play. One element embarrassing the situation was the attitude of the Pope, who claimed to be consulted, and without whose formal assent the Duke of Bavaria was only Emperor by courtesy. He was acknowledged to be King of the Romans, for this was a matter of election and normally a stepping-stone to the higher dignity; but before he could become Emperor, Lewis needed to be consecrated by the Pontiff. Throughout his reign this recognition, though more than once he sought it carefully with tears, was never obtained from the head of the Church, who was a guest and ally of France.

The Emperor, as he was *de facto*, had married Margaret, the eldest daughter of Count William of Hainault, who, on the extinction of the old dynasty, had become Count of Holland; and, in the event of the failure of heirs male, Lewis had every prospect of reintroducing into the Empire ancient provinces, whose sentiment of attachment had grown weak. Edward III., when still under age, had wedded Philippa, Margaret's youngest sister, and Raynald of Gueldres had espoused the King of England's sister. William of Juliers was a warm supporter of the Anglo-German alliance; and

*Detached.*

Marshal Davoust, Duke of Auerstadt ... ..	28,000
Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia ... ..	27,000
Prince Murat's Cavalry ... ..	10,000

T. MILLER MAGUIRE.

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